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The income distribution in many developed countries widened dramatically from 1970 to 2000. Scholars
speculate that inequality contributes to a host of social ills by weakening the public sector. In contrast,
we find that growing income inequality is associated with an expansion in revenues and expenditures
on a wide range of services at the municipal and school district levels in the United States. These results
are robust to a number of model specifications, including instrumental variables that deal with the
endogeneity of local expenditures. Our results are inconsistent with models that predict heterogeneous
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  Over the past thirty years, the income distribution has widened dramatically in the United 
States and many other developed countries (Piketty and Saez, 2003; Smeeding, 2004). Income 
inequality is correlated with several negative social outcomes—including high crime rates, low 
levels  of  education  achievement,  and  bad  health.
1  Yet, little is known about  whether these 
relationships are causal and, if so,  the channels through which a widening income distribution 
might translate into these social ills. 
One frequently proposed mechanism is that income inequality may weaken the public 
sector. Some political economy models suggest that, in heterogeneous societies, residents cannot 
agree either on the composition of public goods or  on the taxes and charges used to fund them 
(Benabou, 1996, 2000). In particular, rich households may rely on private alternatives to public 
goods and the poor may prioritize personal consumption over  public contributions, generating 
dissent between the ends and the middle of the income distribution (Epple and Romano, 1996).
2 
On the other hand, models based on the median voter theorem predict that a widening of the 
income distribution will encourage greater use of progressive taxation for redistribution (Meltzer 
and Richard, 1981; Alesina and Rodri k, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994).   Societies with 
greater  inequality  may  also  have  greater  needs,  leading  altruistic  voters  to  support  social 
programs. 
Existing empirical work has not provided  definitive evidence for the direction of the 
relationship  between  income  inequality  and  the  size  of  the  public  sector .
3  Two  types  of 
                                                 
1 See, inter alia, Kawachi, et al., 1997; Kennedy, et al., 1998; and Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 2002. For an 
opposing view, see Deaton and Lubotsky, 2002. 
2 Heterogeneity can also reduce social capital between residents, which may undermine trust, norms of reciprocity, 
and support for local government activity (Putnam, 2000; Boix and Posner, 1998; Costa and Kahn, 2003). 
3 In a cross-section of countries, countries with high levels of inequality, like the United States, engage in less public 
spending (see, for example, Lindert, 1994, 1996; Moene and Wallerstein, 2005; Schwabish, Smeeding, and Osberg, 
2006). In contrast, comparisons across US states and within states over time find that rising income inequality is  
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identification problems compound the lack of a consistent empirical relationship between income 
inequality and public goods provision. Cross-country comparisons suffer from omitted variable 
bias; that is, countries with high income inequality may also have other characteristics that could 
limit the size of the public sector. Cross-state comparisons additionally suffer from endogenous 
household sorting. If high-income families migrate to states with high public expenditures, the 
positive  association  observed  in  the  literature  between  state  public  expenditures  and  income 
inequality may be spurious. 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between income inequality and government 
finances  at  the  local  level  in  the  United  States  from  1970  to  2000.  We  focus  mainly  on 
municipalities  and  school  districts,  but  also  present  estimates  for  states.  Local  government 
represent a large segment of the economy; in the 2009 fiscal year, local governments disbursed 
more than $3 trillion in aggregate for such important services as education and public safety.
4 
Our study has several advantages over existing empirical work. First,  large samples of 
municipalities and school districts exhibit much greater variation in income inequality over time 
than do the small number of countries or states used in previous  studies. Secondly, we develop 
an instrumental variable strategy to mitigate concerns about  potential reverse causality from the 
endogenous sorting of households across localities. Our procedure synthetically advances the 
income distribution in a city or school district forward from 1970 by matching the initial income 
distribution  to  national  patterns  of  income  growth  over  the  next  decades.  By  design,  our 
instrument cannot be influenced by mobility into and out of communities; rather, it isolates the 
                                                                                                                                                             
accompanied by higher government expenditures and increasing progressivity in the state tax code (Chernick, 2005; 
Schwabish, 2008). 
4 State governments accounted for $1.36 billion in expenditures in 2009, while all other local governments (cities, 
school districts, etc.) accounted for $1.72 billion in that fiscal year. The federal government spent $3.52 billion in 
2009. Beyond cities and school districts, counties and special districts provide local services, though these 
governmental units represent a relatively small share of the total expenditures. These facts were compiled from the 
website http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/.  
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component of change in the local income distribution that is driven by shifts in the return to skill 
over time. 
We find no evidence that an increase in income inequality reduces expenditures on public 
services in cities or school districts; rather, as the income distribution widens, localities increase 
their revenue collection and expenditures. Our best causal estimates suggest that the average 
increase in the city-level Gini coefficient over this period (5 points) leads to a $63 increase in 
expenditures per resident. These values imply that the widening of the income distribution from 
1970 to 2000 can explain 15 percent of the growth in municipal expenditures over this period. 
Among school districts, the average change in the Gini is associated with a $198 increase in 
property tax revenue per pupil with a corresponding $190 decline in state transfers. Although 
rising inequality can explain 29 percent of the growth in property tax revenue from 1970 to 2000, 
state  systems  of school  finance equalization appear to  have undone much of the connection 
between changes in the local income distribution and local revenue collection. 
For  municipalities,  rising  income  inequality  is  not  only  associated  with  increased 
expenditures on police services, which we may expect if inequality also leads to higher crime 
rates, but also generates additional outlays for fire protection and road maintenance. In related 
results,  we  find  that  growing  racial  fractionalization  is  associated  with  larger  government 
expenditures across a wide range of expenditure categories, casting doubt on earlier findings that 
more racially fragmented cities spend a smaller share of their budget on public goods (Alesina, 
Baqir and Easterly, 1999; see also Cutler, Elmendorf and Zeckhauser, 1993; Hopkins, 2009). 
State level results also show a positive impact of inequality on local finances, but the estimates 
are not precise enough to be statistically distinguished from zero.  
 
4 
Our  results  are  consistent  with  recent  work  by  Corcoran  and  Evans  (2010),  which 
documents a positive relationship between income inequality and educational expenditures at the 
school district level.
5 Yet, a series of papers have found that,  before World War II, unequal 
communities raised less local revenue and provided fewer common goods and services (Goldin 
and Katz, 1999; Ramcharan, 2009; Galor, Moav and Vollrath, 2009; Zolt, 2009). Taken together, 
these results suggest that the relationship  between  income  inequality and the size of  local 
government has changed over time. This change may be due to  shifts in the sources of local 
revenue away from property taxation toward more regressive revenue sources like sales taxes 
and direct charges, or to the increasing role of state governments in funding (and, in some cases, 
providing) goods that have historically been the responsibility of localities. 
Our findings are inconsistent with models that predict that heterogeneous societies are 
unable to compromise on common public goods and services. While our evidence is more 
supportive of the median voter model, we caution that cities and school districts do not rely on 
progressive forms of revenue, such as income taxation, and rarely engage in spending that is 
explicitly redistributive. Therefore, it is unlikely that, in this context, rising inequality lowers the 
tax price of public services for the median voter.  With  this caveat  in mind, we prefer to 
emphasize our substantive findings ; reconciling  these patterns with models of local political 
economy provides a rich area for future research. Overall, our findings challenge the hypothesis 
that income inequality reduces t he provision of public goods from local governments in the 
United States. 
The remainder of the   paper is organized as follows. The next section  discusses  our 
measures of income inequality and government activity at the local level. Section III  describes 
                                                 
5 Our results were generated independently of Corcoran and Evans’ recent study. We reach similar conclusions 
despite using different methods to measure income inequality within school districts and developing a different 
instrument for changes in inequality at the local level.  
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our panel estimation as well as an instrument for shifts in the local income distribution. Section 
IV  documents  the  positive  relationship  between  changes  in  local  inequality  and  growing 
revenues and expenditures at the city, school district and state levels. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Data on Income Distribution and Government Activity at the Local Level 
II.A. Income Inequality 
We collect decadal data on the income distribution and the levels of expenditures and 
revenues from 1970 to 2000 for a large number of cities and school districts. The municipal 
sample consists of a balanced panel of every Census-defined place (incorporated city or town) 
with 2,500 or more residents in 1970. We exclude the 903 municipalities that were directly 
responsible for providing education services, leaving us with a sample of 3,369 cities and towns. 
The majority of our sample is made up of small towns: 65 percent of the municipalities in the 
sample have fewer than 10,000 residents. Our school district sample contains the 9,024  districts 
with more than 2,500 residents in 1970.
6 
Because of Census privacy restrictions, we cannot recover the full income distribution at 
the  local  level.  Instead,  we  use  published  Census  reports ,  which  indicate  the  number  of 
households in a jurisdiction in each of 15 to 20 income categories, to generate an (approximate) 
income distribution. We assign each household an income level equal to the median income in its 
                                                 
6 The Census of Population provides demographic information for 11,687 and 14,405 school districts in 1970 and 
2000, respectively. We use the School District Geographic Reference File for 1970 to combine the demographic 
information with expenditure data from the Census of Governments (available at 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/3515/detail). The sample consists of the 9,024 school districts 
that could be matched between 1970 and 2000. This sampling rule eliminates school districts that eventually 
disappear from the data due, for example, to consolidations with other districts. We choose not to aggregate districts 
that eventually consolidate because the political economy mechanism that we have in mind pertains to the actual 
voters and residents of a district. As a result, a component of the measured variation in income inequality over time 
within a district will be due to mergers with neighboring districts.  
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bin by decade as calculated from Census micro-data. We then generate Gini coefficients at the 
local level for this modified income distribution.
7 
In 1970, the average municipality in our sample had a Gini coefficient of 0.32, compared 
to the national Gini coefficient of 0.39  (Table 1). By 2000, the Gini coefficient in the average 
municipality increased by 5.5 points to 0.38. However, this average increase hides tremendous 
variation across municipalities. The Gini coefficient increased by less than one point (or even 
decreased) in one third of the cities in our sample , while in another third the Gini coefficient 
increased by more than five points.  
 
II.B. City Finances 
The Census (and Surveys) of Governments provide information on municipal revenues 
and expenditures by detailed category. The first panel of Table 1 contains summary statistics on 
the sources of revenue and the categories of current expenditures at the municipality level. All 
values are reported in year 2000 dollars. In the average municipality, expenditures per resident 
doubled from $460 in 1970 to $870 by 2000. Municipalities allocate the majority of their budget 
toward the maintenance of local infrastructure and on fire and police protection. Spending on 
infrastructure, including roads, sewers, water and electricity, comprise 44 percent of average 
municipal budgets and spending on police and fire protection make up another 21 percent. In 
comparison, redistribution in the form of direct public welfare and expenditures on health and 
public hospitals contribute a negligible amount (less than five percent) of the typical municipal 
budget. 
                                                 
7 Without a full set of micro data at the municipal level, we are unable to calculate other measures of inequality, 
such as the 90-10 ratio, with sufficient accuracy.  
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In 1970, property taxes were the largest source of municipal revenue, accounting for 33 
percent of total proceeds. By 2000, the reliance on property taxes declined to only 22 percent of 
the total budget, replaced in large part by inter-governmental transfers and direct charges for 
services.
8 Sales taxes also increased from a negligible portion of the budget in 1970 to 12 percent 
of total revenue in 2000. Political economy models often assume that tax revenue is generated 
through a progressive tax instrument, such as an income tax. However, most  property and sales 
taxes are regressive in the sense that they require higher tax payments as a share of total income 
from poor households (Suits, 1977; Phares, 1985).
9 Direct charges may be even more regressive 
than property taxation because they are levied on a per house basis rather than tied to the value of 
the home.
10  On the other side of the ledger, inter -governmental transfers  are often  financed 
through progressive state or federal income taxes; however, the tax burden for these transfers 
disproportionately falls on households living outside of the locality in question.  
We caution that higher government expenditures need not be synonymous with a higher 
quality or quantity of public services for the average resident. First, the majority of government 
expenditures cover the wages and salaries of municipal wor kers, an increase in which may not 
translate into a higher quality of service provision. Secondly, anecdotal evidence suggests that a 
greater share of city services are directed toward high -income neighborhoods; however, with 
existing  data  sets,  we  cannot  observe  how  municipal  services  are  allocated  within  the 
jurisdiction. Finally, we note that local governments may expand certain programs in order to 
                                                 
8 The relative decline in property taxes from 1970 to 2000 was part of a larger decline in the use of local property 
taxes over the twentieth century (Oates and Schwab, 2004; Sokoloff and Zolt, 2007). This trend was accelerated in 
the 1980s by statutory limits on the level or growth of property tax rates in some states. 
9 Specific features of the tax system, including exemptions for food and other items from sales taxes or initial 
threshold exemptions from property taxes, can affect the incidence of these instruments. There is significant 
scholarly debate about the true incidence of the property tax (see Mieszkowski, 1972; Aaron, 1974; Musgrave, 1974 
and Hamilton, 1976).  
10 The largest categories of direct charges are for sewers (23 percent), hospitals (20 percent), airports (8 percent) and 
sanitation services (8 percent).  
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combat new social problems associated with rising income inequality, thereby leaving the level 
of public services unchanged. For example, inequality has been linked to higher rates of violent 
crime (Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 2002). Cities may hire additional police officers to 
combat the higher crime rates, resulting in more government spending without net improvements 
in public safety. 
 
II.C. School District Finances 
The second panel of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our school district 
sample. In 1970, the typical district spent $4,140 per pupil. By 2000, this total nearly doubled to 
$7,868 per pupil. The sources of school district revenue changed dramatically over this period. 
While,  in  1970,  school  revenues  were  evenly  split  between  local  property  taxes  and  inter-
governmental transfers, by 2000 state and federal transfers made up 70 percent of the average 
school district budget.  
The changing pattern of revenues in our sample reflects the increasing centralization of 
K-12 funding over time. States began to supplement local revenues for education services in the 
mid-twentieth century. At that time, state aid was typically disbursed as a flat grant per pupil, 
with additional funds provided to poor districts (Hoxby, 2001). In 1965, the federal government 
began providing school funding through Title I of the Elementary and Secondary School Act 
(Cascio, et al., 2010). As a result, by 1970, locally-raised revenue only accounted for 60 percent 
of school district budgets. 
More recently, the use of local revenue sources, even as a supplement to state aid, has 
been called into question. Property taxes allow wealthy districts to raise more revenue than poor 
districts at the same tax rate, thereby generating an association between the level of wealth in a  
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district and its level of school funding. Starting with the Serrano v. Priest decision in California 
(1971), many state supreme courts have ruled that existing systems of local school finance are 
unconstitutional.
11 
In response to these legal challenges, states have adopted various plans to equalize school 
funding across districts (Hoxby, 2001; Metzler 2003). The most common approach has been to 
modify a state’s aid formula in order to directly supplement districts with smaller local property 
tax capacity. Some states also guarantee that districts will be able to raise a certain level of 
revenue at a given tax rate; the difference between locally raised revenue and the guaranteed 
level is then made up by the state. Following this wave of reforms, the share of school revenues 
raised through local property taxes declined from 60 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 2004. 
 
III. Estimating the Relationship Between Income Inequality and Government Activity 
III.A. Basic Specification for Municipalities 
The relationship between income inequality and public finances can be described by the 
following equation: 
 
yit = β(Gini)it + ΓXit + εit     εit =   i +  it            (1) 
 
where i indexes a city or town in Census year t, y is a local public finance outcomes such as total 
expenditures, Gini is the Gini coefficient, and the coefficient β indicates the estimated effect of 
income  inequality  on  local  finances.  X  contains  a  set  of  time-varying  city  characteristics, 
                                                 
11 Differences in school funding on the basis of local property wealth have been found to violate rights to equal 
protection under some state constitutions (Briffault, 2006). In other states, local financing violates constitutional 
provisions requiring that the state provide an adequate elementary and secondary education to all students. Claims 
under the Federal equal protection clause were denied by the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez.  
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including total population, the share of the population that is black, Hispanic, or over 65 years of 
age, and median household income. εit captures the unobserved determinant of local finances, 
which depends on a permanent component  i and a transitory component  it. 
Pooling data from 1970 to 2000, we estimate the following equation in first differences to 
absorb the permanent component of the error term ( i): 
 
∆yit = β(∆Gini)it + Γ∆Xit + Rit + ∆ it              (2) 
 
where equation (2) also includes the vector Rit to allow each Census region to have distinct time 
trends in both patterns of government finances and income inequality. The coefficient of interest 
(β) indicates the relationship between changes in the Gini coefficient and changes in government 
revenue or expenditure within a municipality over time, holding constant changes in median 
income and basic demographics. For the rest of the paper we refer to equation (2) as the OLS 
specification. 
 
III.B. Instrumental Variable for Income Inequality 
Equation 2 is not sufficient, on its own, to establish a causal relationship between income 
inequality and local government finances. On the one hand, the income distribution may affect 
government activity through a number of channels: the preferences of local voters, compensatory 
transfers from the state and federal government, or simply a mechanical relationship between 
inequality  and  the  size  of  the  local  tax  base.  However,  it  is  also  possible  that  changes  in 
government expenditures could induce shifts in the local income distribution. For instance, an 
increase  in  local  expenditures  may  attract  wealthy  households  who  prefer  generous  public  
 
11 
services even at the expense of higher taxes. These high-income arrivals would widen the local 
income distribution. 
To mitigate concerns about this form of reverse causality, we construct an instrumental 
variable  that  is  correlated  with  changes  in  an  area’s  Gini  coefficient  but  is  not  otherwise 
associated  with  changes  in  local  revenues  or  expenditures.  Our  instrument  is  based  on  a 
―synthetic‖  version  of  the  income  distribution  in  a  municipality.  Recall  that  the  actual  Gini 
coefficient is calculated from counts of the number of households in a locality by income bin in 
every decade. The first step in constructing our instrument is to replace these decade-specific 
household tallies with the initial (1970) distribution of households by income bin. By freezing 
the distribution of households across bins in 1970, we foreclose the possibility that richer or 
poorer households move into a town in search of a given bundle of public goods. 
We then allow the income level of households in the synthetic distribution to grow over 
time according to  the actual change  in  median income by income bin and decade from  the 
Census micro-data.
12 As a result, time series variation in the synthetic distribution  stems only 
from national patterns of income growth by segment of the income distribution. In other words, 
the initial income distribution in an area serves as a set of weights indicating how  national 
income growth  likely  affects each locality. For example, in the 1980s, the income level of 
households in the top income bin grew faster than  those for  the rest of the distribu tion. The 
instrument will therefore predict greater changes in the Gini coefficient  over the 1980s  in 
municipalities that started out with a large number of high-income households in 1970. 
                                                 
12 To calculate the median income of a 1970 income bin in later decades, we convert the endpoints of each bin, 
which are denominated in absolute income levels, into percentiles of the income distribution. Results are 




  We present the first stage relationship between the actual and synthetic Gini coefficients 
in graphical form in Figure 1 both in level and in changes. We find a strong positive relationship 
between the two measures, suggesting that much of the change in local income distributions 
from 1970 to 2000 was driven by trends in income growth, rather than by in- and out-mobility of 
households from the top or bottom of the income distribution. The F-statistic on the relationship 
between  the  actual  and  synthetic  Gini  coefficients  is  975.77,  surpassing  the  conventional 
threshold for a strong instrument by two orders of magnitude. 
 
III.C. Additional Specification for School Districts 
Because of the substantial changes in the arrangement of school finance over this period, 
analyzing the relationship between income inequality and school district revenues requires some 
care. In particular, we want to allow for the possibility that an increase in income inequality may 
have different effects in states with and without school financing equalization plans. Districts 
that experience rising income inequality due to income growth for the rich may be heavily taxed 
by state equalization plans, whereas districts with inequality driven by falling incomes among the 
poor may be heavily subsidized. 
We define SFR (―school finance reform‖), an indicator variable equal to one in states 
whose systems of school finance have been deemed unconstitutional by the state supreme court. 
This condition that applies to 14 states by 2000.
13 Equation 3 interacts this state-level reform 
indicator with changes in the school district-level Gini coefficient. We estimate: 
 
∆yit =   θ(SFR)it + β1(∆Gini)it + β2(∆Gini · SFR)it + Rit + Γ∆Xit +  it     (3) 
                                                 




where  i  indexes  school  districts  and  t  indicates  the  Census  decade  (t  =  1970,  2000).  The 
coefficient β1 summarizes the relationship between changes in income inequality and changes in 
revenues or expenditures per pupil in the average school district. The coefficient β2 tests whether 
this relationship is different in states that fell under court order to reform their system of school 
finance by 2000. We also allow the effect of district-level median income to vary according to a 
state’s school finance regime. 
We  should  note  that  some  states  that  did  not  face  a  court  order  to  equalize  school 
spending over this period might have reformed their school finance systems preemptively in 
order to avoid the threat of litigation (Metzler, 2003). In this case, the two groups of states may 
respond equivalently to changes in inequality, leading the coefficients on the interaction terms to 
be indistinguishable from zero. 
 
IV. Results 
IV.A. Impact of Income Inequality on Municipalities 
Table  2  presents  results  from  equation  2,  which  estimates  the  relationship  between 
changes in income inequality and changes in government revenue or expenditure within a city 
over time. We find that an increase in inequality leads to modest growth in municipal revenues 
and expenditures. The coefficients imply that a five point increase in the Gini coefficient, the 
average change in the Gini over this period, is associated with a $27 increase in expenditures per 
capita. Police spending represents $3 of the total increase in municipal expenditures, while the 
remainder  is  spent  on  other  ―productive‖  public  services  including  fire  protection  and  local 
roads. Income inequality has little effect on spending for either public welfare or health and  
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hospitals;  however,  together,  these  categories  represent  less  than  five  percent  of  the  typical 
municipal budget.  
The revenues required to fund these expenditures are collected by means of a range of 
local  tax  instruments,  including  property  taxes,  sales  taxes,  and  direct  charges  for  services. 
Higher property tax revenues could stem either from a decision to increase the tax rate or from a 
more mechanical relationship between inequality and the property tax base. The one revenue 
category that is not associated with a widening of the income distribution is federal and state 
transfers. This may not be surprising because the majority of state transfers to local governments 
are  provided  to  school  districts,  which  are  examined  in  the  next  section,  and  because  state 
transfers to municipalities are based on formulas that often do not take into account the local 
income distribution. 
Table 3 considers heterogeneous effects of inequality on government revenue by initial 
municipality size and by initial median income. We subdivide the sample first by median size in 
1970 (6,500 residents) and then by median household income ($41,000 in 2000 dollars). An 
increase in income inequality is associated with greater revenue collection in all cases. However, 
the positive relationship between income inequality and government revenues is strongest in 
smaller and richer towns. Residents of smaller towns may develop a stronger base of social 
capital and therefore be willing to fund public goods even as the ends of the income distribution 
begin to pull away from the middle. We note that, in particular, rich towns are more likely to 
expand their property tax collection as the income distribution widens. This is consistent with a 
greater increase in top-end inequality in rich towns; as the rich get richer, the property tax base 
may increase.   
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Table 4 contains results from the second stage of our instrumental variables analysis, in 
which we instrument for actual changes in the Gini coefficient with changes in national income 
growth weighted by the initial income distribution in a locality. Most of the IV coefficients are 
positive, statistically significant and, if anything, are larger than their OLS counterparts. In the 
IV specification, rising inequality increases municipal revenue from all major sources, including 
inter-governmental  transfers.  However,  the  relationship  between  inequality  and  the  separate 
categories  of  expenditures  are  not  statistically  significant  in  the  IV  regressions,  with  the 
exception of fire protection.  
If our OLS estimates were plagued by reverse causality – for example, because the rich 
are attracted to towns with generous public services – we would expect the IV coefficients to be 
smaller  than  OLS.  The  fact  that  the  IV  estimates  are  larger  than  OLS  suggests  that  the 
instrumental variables procedure may instead be correcting for measurement error, which can 
bias estimates towards zero. By these estimates, a five point increase in the Gini coefficient leads 
to  a  $63  increase  in  expenditures  per  capita.  From  1970-2000,  the  average  municipality 
experienced a $410 increase in revenues per capita. The widening of the income distribution can 
thus explain 15 percent of the growth in the size of local governments from 1970 to 2000 (= 
63/410). Overall, the pattern of both OLS and IV results suggests that income inequality neither 
reduces the demand for municipal goods and services nor does it limit residents’ ability to pay 
for them. 
 
IV.B. Impact of Change in Racial Heterogeneity on Municipalities 
Table  5  examines  the  effect  of  another  form  of  local  heterogeneity,  racial 
fractionalization, on municipal budgets. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) argue that, although  
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cities with a racially diverse population spend more per resident, they devote a smaller share of 
their budget to ―productive‖ public goods, such as roads, sewers and trash collection. We re-
estimate equation 2, replacing the separate measures of black and Hispanic population share with 
an index of racial/ethnic fractionalization. Our index is based on four racial/ethnic categories: 
white, non-Hispanics; black, non-Hispanics; Hispanics; and other races (which include Asians, 
Pacific Islanders and American Indians).
14 We improve upon the methodology used in  Alesina, 
et al. by using a panel of cities from 1970 to 2000, rather than a single cross-section in 1990, and 
by extending the analysis to municipalities with fewer than 25,000 residents.  
As in Alesina, et al., we find that an increase in racial heterogeneity is associated with 
larger municipal expenditures. While half of the increase is due to higher police spending, we 
also find large positive effects on fire protection and health and hospital spending. Because 
spending on roads fails to keep pace with the overall increase in expenditures, the  share of the 
budget dedicated to roads does fall, which Alesina, et al. interprets as a decline in the share of 
revenue dedicated to productive public goods. However, we contend that the interpretation of 
these  patterns  are  extremely  sensitive  to  the  classification  of  municipal  spending  into 
―productive‖ versus ―non-productive‖ public goods. It is reasonable to believe that spending on 
fire  protection  and  public  hospitals  are  equally  as  productive  as  spending  on  roads  and, 
conversely, that spending on roads is equally susceptible to corruption for patronage purposes. 
On  the  revenue  side,  we  confirm  Alesina  et  al.’s  finding  that  racial  heterogeneity  is 
associated  with  an  increase  in  inter-governmental  transfers.  However,  we  dispute  the 
interpretation that racially diverse cities are unwilling to raise their own revenue and therefore 
need  to  be  subsidized  by  the  state  ―to  compensate…[for]  the  difficulties…in  directing  local 
                                                 
14 The racial fractionalization index is defined as 1 – Σi  (Number of residents of race or ethnicityi)
2. Separate counts 
of Asian and Pacific Islanders do not exist at the municipal level in 1970 or 1980.
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resources to the supply of public goods‖ (p. 1266). Instead, we find that an increase in racial 
diversity is also associated with an increase in own-source revenue collection, including both 
property and sales taxes. 
 
IV.C. Impact of Income Inequality on School Districts 
Turning to school districts, we begin in Table 6 by estimating the baseline specification 
(equation  2),  which  relates  decadal  changes  in  income  inequality  to  changes  in  government 
activity, first in OLS and then using our instrument for district-level changes in inequality. As for 
municipalities, we find that an increase in income inequality among residents of a school district 
is  associated  with  rising  expenditures  per  pupil.  However,  the  relationship  between  income 
inequality and total expenditures per pupil is small. According to our IV estimate, a 1.1 point 
increase in the Gini coefficient, the average increase at the district-level from 1970 to 2000, 
would result in only $29 additional dollars of expenditure per pupil.  
The total effect of inequality on school resources masks countervailing trends for the two 
main sources of revenue. A 1.1 point increase in the Gini is associated with a $198 increase in 
property tax revenue per pupil and a corresponding $190 decline in state transfers. This pattern is 
consistent with the prospect that state systems of school finance equalization worked to undo the 
association between the local income distribution and local revenue collection. The next table 
tests this hypothesis more directly. 
Table  7  presents  coefficients  from  equation  3,  which  allows  the  effect  of  income 
inequality on school district finances to vary with a state’s system of school finance. For this 
specification, we consider long-run changes in school expenditures from 1970 to 2000 in order to 
allow the reforms of the 1970s and 1980s time to take hold. Table 7 reports only OLS results  
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because the instrument is not sufficiently powerful to explain changes in inequality over this 
thirty year interval. The first panel replicates the basic specification (presented in Table 6) over 
this thirty year period; in the second panel, we allow the relationships between a district’s level 
of income inequality and its median income to differ in states with and without court-ordered 
school finance reform.  
The first row of Table 7 shows that states under court-order to reform their system of 
school finance provide a higher level of state transfers per pupil (see also Card and Payne, 2002). 
By 2000, the average district under court order received an additional $474 of state funding per 
pupil. However, a portion of this state transfer was reversed by a corresponding reduction in 
local property tax revenue. Overall, we find no difference in the level of total expenditures per 
pupil in states with and without court-ordered school finance reform, but instead see differences 
only in the source of this revenue. As in Table 6, we document that school districts in which the 
income distribution widened between 1970 and 2000 raise more revenue per pupil from property 
taxation. The magnitude of these effects is somewhat smaller than the decadal IV estimates; a 1.1 
point increase in the Gini coefficient is associated with $57 of additional property tax revenue 
per pupil. In this specification, we do not find a corresponding decline in state transfers in the 
average district. However, as the next panel shows, the relationship between inequality and state 
transfers differs in states with and without court-ordered school finance reform. 
Panel  2  demonstrates  that  the  relationship  between  income  inequality  and  school 
expenditures is mediated by a state’s system of school finance. In districts whose state system of 
school finance are not under court supervision, rising inequality is positively related to both 
property tax revenue and state transfers, such that a 1.1 point increase in the Gini would lead to a 
$61 increase in total resources per pupil. However, in states required to equalize school funding,  
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a 1.1 point increase in the Gini coefficient is associated with a $44 decline in state transfers per 
pupil offset by a corresponding $94 dollar increase in property tax revenue. This pattern could be 
generated by a rise in top-end inequality. As the rich get richer, the property tax base in a district 
may expand, allowing for greater amounts of own-source revenue collection. However, in states 
with strong equalization programs, most of the excess taxing capacity that accompanies rising 
income inequality is offset by reductions in state aid. 
Table 7 also reports the relationship between educational expenditures and the median 
income  of  a  school  district’s  residents.  Not  surprisingly,  wealthier  districts  spend  more  on 
education per pupil. On average, a five percent increase in median income is associated with a 
$102 dollar increase in per-pupil expenditures. As in Card and Payne (2002), we find that the 
presence  of  an  equalization  court  order  does  not  change  the  magnitude  of  the  relationship 
between local income and school expenditures but does alter the source of these additional funds. 
In states that are not under court order, an increase in local median income is associated with 
greater  school  resources  from  both  own-source  revenue  and  state  transfers.  In  contrast,  in 
equalization states, state transfers do not increase with local median income. Instead, the loss of 
state revenue is compensated with a stronger association between median income and property 
tax revenue. 
 
IV.D. Impact of Income Inequality on States 
Lastly, we consider the relationship between changes in income inequality and changes in 
revenues and expenditures at the state level. State-level tax systems vary greatly, both in their 
choice of tax instruments and in their degree of progressivity. For example, while the average 
state relies on personal income taxation for 12 percent of its revenue, nine states do not impose  
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an income tax at all. Although state income taxes are generally progressive, with the degree of 
progressivity determined by the rate structure, the tax-free threshold, and the use of exemptions 
and credits, the overall bundle of state taxes tend to be mildly regressive (Chernick, 2005; Davis, 
et al., 2009). 
In states with a progressive income tax system, the median voter model would predict a 
stronger  relationship  between  income  inequality  and  state-level  fiscal  outcomes  (Hayes  and 
Slottje, 1989; Fletcher and Murray, 2008). Descriptive statistics seem to confirm this intuition: 
average  state  Gini  increased  from  0.357  in  1970  to  0.43  in  2000,  while  total  revenues  and 
expenditures per capita increased by approximately $1,800 (on a basis of approximately $2,000) 
over these decades.
15 Yet, mechanisms like voter altruism and social capital may be less effective 
for larger jurisdictions, which could attenuate (or even reverse) any positive relationship between 
inequality and expenditures at the state level. 
Table 8 presents state level results. Estimates are based on equation 2, with all municipal 
fiscal outcomes replaced by state fiscal outcomes.  We find that an increase in inequality  has a 
positive  effect  on   state  revenues  and  expenditures   but  all  estimates  are  statistically 
indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels. Consistent with median voter models, we do 
see that a  7.3 point increase in the Gini coefficient, the average increase in this measure of 
income inequality at the state level from 1970 to 2000, is associated with a  $913 increase in 
general tax revenue per capita. Similarly, changes in income inequality have a positive effect on 
total state-level expenditures (but are statistically indistinguishable from zero). All expenditure 
sub-items show a positive effect, with the exception of  public welfare. Instrumental variable 
estimates show similar patterns.
16  Overall, Table  8  estimates  suggest that  increasing  income 
                                                 
15 State fiscal data are collected from the Census of Governments. Appendix Table 1 provides summary statistics. 
16 These estimates are available upon request.  
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inequality had, if any, a positive impact on the fiscal situation of state governments. However, as 
opposed to our previous estimates at the city and school district level, the limited number of 
observations at the state level does not allow us to draw precise inference about the impact of 
income inequality on state finances. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The income distribution in the United States widened greatly from 1970 to 2000. We use 
variation in income dispersion at the local level to examine the relationship between inequality 
and the size of the public sector. Contrary to models that emphasize disagreements between 
residents of heterogeneous societies over the optimal level of public expenditures, we find that 
rising income inequality is associated with larger increases in tax revenues and faster growth in 
public expenditures at municipal, school district and state levels. 
Revenues and expenditures per resident increased in nearly all communities over this 
period.  Our  best  causal  estimates  suggest  that  a  five  point  increase  in  the  Gini  coefficient, 
roughly  the  change  in  the  average  locality  from  1970  to  2000,  leads  to  a  $63  increase  in 
municipal  expenditures  per  resident  to  cover  services  like  police  and  fire  protection  and 
infrastructure maintenance and a $190 increase in locally-raised school expenditures per pupil. 
By the estimates, the widening of the income distribution can explain around 15 percent of the 
growth in the size of local government over the period. 
We conclude by noting that, although income inequality is associated with greater public 
expenditures, it is not clear that additional funds necessarily translate into a larger quantity or 
higher quality of public goods. Furthermore, the incidence of local taxation and the distribution 
of local services need not be progressive and likely varies substantially across governmental  
 
22 
units.  Hence,  we  stop  short  of  claiming  that  local  government  activity  wholly  or  partially 
compensates for the potential social ills associated with income inequality. However, given the 
empirical patterns documented here, we argue that it is unlikely that the social ills correlated with 
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Figure 1: First stage regression, Relationship between actual and synthetic Gini coefficients 


































Notes:  Each point in the scatter diagram represents a municipality’s actual and predicted Gini coefficients. Gini 
coefficients are calculated using the income bins from Census reports and the median income of each bin from 































Notes:  Each point in the scatter diagram represents the residual change in a municipality’s actual and predicted Gini 
coefficients over a decade after controlling for changes in population, share of black and Hispanic population, 
median income, share of individuals older than 65 and regional trends.   
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Table 1: Summary statistics, municipal and school district revenues and expenditures, 
1970-2000 
 
  I. Municipalities (per capita) 












A. Revenue             
1970 Mean  0.320  449.7  149.1  99.4  90.2  3.1 
1970 SD  (0.054)  (300.7)  (116.9)  (143.2)  (143.5)  (7.1) 
Δ 1970-2000  0.055  428.6  45.2  100.9  105.1  57.5 
  General 
expenditures 




B. Expenditure             
1970 (Mean)  462.2  76.1  31.4  60.7  0.6  20.6 
1970 (SD)  (436.5)  (45.1)  (34.4)  (34.7)  7.7  117.5 
Δ 1970-2000  410.0  56.6  20.0  9.8  1.9  10.4 
  II. School districts (per pupil) 












1970 (Mean)  0.370  4185.9  4138.9  2071.4  1821.0  238.3 
1970 (SD)  (0.039)  (1833.9)  (2122.2)  (1597.9)  (1036.1)  (246.5) 
Δ 1970-2000  0.011  3794.1  3730.3  679.8  2757.9  48.1 
Notes: Revenues and expenditures are reported in 2000 dollars. We provide the mean of each variable in 1970, the 
standard deviation in 1970 in parentheses and the average change from 1970-2000 in italics. The municipality 
statistics are for the 3,369 cities and towns with at least 2,500 residents in 1970 that do not provide education 
services. The school district statistics reflect the 9,024 districts with more than 2,500 residents in 1970.  
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Table 2: OLS estimates of the relationship between income inequality and municipal 




Property tax  Inter-govern 
Transfers 
Direct charges  Sales tax  Other tax 
474.1**    119.3***  52.46    289.5**    262.5**     73.53*** 
    [209.3]  [43.09]  [85.09]  [120.4]  [120.5]  [26.50] 
           
General 
expenditures 
Police  Fire  Highways  Public welfare  Health & 
hospitals 
 536.3**   53.81**     63.16***     68.41***  -4.399  42.13 
[209.2]  [25.31]  [17.48]  [19.70]   [71.06]  [207.9] 
Notes: Sample includes municipalities in Census years 1970-2000 that were not responsible for education services in 
1970 (N = 13476, or 3369 municipalities per year). Cells report the estimated coefficient on the change in the Gini 
coefficient from equation 2 in text. Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered by municipality.  
 
 
Table 3: The relationship between income inequality and municipal revenue per capita by 
initial population and median income, 1970-2000 
 
  General 
revenue 





Sales tax   Other tax 
  A. By initial population 
Below med    578.3*  88.87*  163.1     331.3**  237.0    102.3*** 
  [298.3]  [49.39]  [103.7]  [166.0]  [150.9]  [33.59] 
             
Above med   170.0      196.6***  -205.8  201.2  263.7*  -0.866 
  [233.5]  [65.08]  [138.7]  [133.3]  [141.7]  [39.32] 
             
  B. By initial median income 
Below med   97.11  57.80  -72.36  352.0*   270.8**  59.10* 
  [341.5]  [42.70]  [116.1]  [191.8]  [132.0]  [32.50] 
             
Above med       802.2***  127.3*  176.8   231.9*  211.0  66.48 
  [261.2]  [74.51]  [128.1]  [121.1]  [216.8]  [42.14] 
Note: Sample includes municipalities in Census years 1970- 2000 that were not responsible for education services in 
1970 (N = 13476, or 3369 municipalities per year). The first and third rows are the estimated coefficients on the 
change in the Gini coefficient from equation 2 for a subsample of municipalities whose population (Panel A) or 
household median income (Panel B) are below the sample median in 1970. The second and fourth rows report the 
same coefficients but for those municipalities whose population (Panel A) or household median income (Panel B) 
are above the sample median in 1970. Median initial population in 1970 was 6,430. Median initial household 
median income was $41,273 in 2000 dollars. Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered by municipality.  
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Table 4: IV estimates of the relationship between income inequality and municipal revenue 




Property tax  Inter-govern 
transfers 
Direct charges  Sales tax   Other tax 
1079*      620.2***      596.3***    498.0**  657.8*  151.8 
[646.8]  [175.2]  [195.3]  [237.6]  [349.1]  [96.83] 
           
General 
expenditures 




1260*  -44.87    134.4**         93.02       -103.2  329.7 
[701.5]  [160.2]  [65.56]  [75.39]  [237.0]  [425.6] 
Notes: Sample includes municipalities in Census years 1970-2000 that were not responsible for education services in 
1970 (N = 13476, or 3369 municipalities per year). Cells report the estimated coefficient on the change in the Gini 
coefficient from equation 2 in text. The instrument for the actual Gini coefficient is based on a ―synthetic‖ version of 




Table 5: OLS estimates of the effect of racial fractionalization on municipal revenue and 




Property tax  Inter-govern 
transfers 
Direct charges  Sales tax  Other tax  
  108.7**       58.12***   56.51*  -9.451  13.49  -0.911 
[52.39]  [14.43]  [30.92]  [29.57]  [37.15]  [13.14] 
           
General 
expenditures 
Police  Fire  Highways  Public welfare  Health & 
hospitals 
103.0*       53.76***       21.75***   5.167   -52.91*  139.8* 
[58.83]  [11.58]  [6.555]  [6.877]  [31.68]  [83.55] 
Notes: Sample includes municipalities in Census years 1970-2000 that were not responsible for education services in 
1972 (N = 13476, or 3369 municipalities per year). Cells report the estimated coefficient β from equation 2 in text 
but replacing the Gini coefficient by the index of racial fractionalization. Standard errors in parentheses and are 
clustered by municipality.  
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Table 6: OLS and IV estimates of the relationship between income inequality and school 
district revenue and expenditure per capita, 1970-2000 
 







946.3      2471***     -2086*** 
[657.8]  [625.5]  [555.6] 
     







2678     18084***  -17341*** 
[4405]       [4298]       [2762] 
Notes: Sample includes school districts in Census years 1970-2000 (N = 36,096, or 9,024 school districts per year). 
Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered by school district. Cells report the estimated coefficient on the 
change in the Gini coefficient from equation 2 in text. The instrument for the actual Gini coefficient is based on a 
―synthetic‖ version of the local income distribution; see Section IIIb for details. 
 
Table 7: Effect of median income and income inequality on school district revenue and 
expenditures per pupil, 1970-2000 
 
  Panel 1  Panel 2 












Court order (SFR)  72.10     -147.0     473.9**  -4506     -9619  14884** 
  [262.0]   [259.7]  [218.4]  [6531]  [8460]    [7033] 
             
Gini coefficient     6089***  5232***  1414     5626**   4069**  3210* 
    [1871]    [1694]  [1612]  [2251]    [1893]  [1681] 
             
Gini · SFR        796.9  4503    -7213** 
         [4457]  [4256]   [3437] 
             
ln(median income)     2036***    265.1***     1447***     2043***  281.5***    1422** 
  [138.9]   [68.85]    [80.34]  [143.3]  [69.68]  [77.57] 
             
ln(median) · SFR        403.2  731.0  -1099* 
         [526.1]  [684.0]  [583.9] 
Notes: Sample includes school districts in Census years 1970 and 2000 (N = 18,048, or 9024 school districts per 
year). Cells report the estimated coefficients of equation 3 in text. SFR is an indicator variable equal to one in the 
year 2000 for the 14 states whose systems of school finance were deemed unconstitutional by the state supreme 




Table 8: OLS estimates of the relationship between income inequality and state revenues 













12503    1773*     20052**  2735  -22579   
(8058)  (1050)  (10064)  (1893)  (15156)   









13099  167  388  3633  329  -39 
(11229)  (282)  (1375)  (5569)  (933)  (1269) 
Notes: Sample includes all US states in Census years 1970-2000. Cells report the estimated coefficient on the 




Appendix Table 1: Summary statistics, State revenue and expenditures per capita, 
1970-2000 
 












A. Revenue             
1970 Mean  0.357  2057  601  253  506  515 
1970 SD  (0.024)  (2241)  (188)  (202)  (220)  (2030) 
Δ 1970-2000  0.073  1717  281  486  525  321 








B. Expenditure             
1970 (Mean)  1849  43  367  751  113  241 
1970 (SD)  (642)  (23)  (162)  (250)  (35)  (103) 
Δ 1970-2000  1805  117  -28  549  140  569 
Notes: Revenues and expenditures are reported in 2000 dollars. We provide the mean of each variable in 1970, the 
standard deviation in 1970 in parentheses and the average change from 1970-2000 in italics. The state statistics are 
for all US states. 
 